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Colloquium Brief
U.S. Army War College,
Queens University, and
		
the Canadian Land Forces Doctrine and Training System

DEFENSE, DEVELOPMENT, AND DIPLOMACY (3D):
CANADIAN AND U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES
Compiled by
Dr. Max G. Manwaring
Strategic Studies Institute

Key Points and Recommendations:
• War has changed. New organizing principles require a new paradigm that facilitates change from a
singular military approach to a multidimensional, multi-organizational, and multilateral/multinational
whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance/coalition approach to deal more effectively with the
contemporary global security reality.
• Based on its 3-D (Defense, Development, and Diplomacy) approach, Canada has made great strides
in developing a new external conflict and internal catastrophe/disaster paradigm in which traditional
military and police organizations continue to play major roles, but are closely coordinated with all the
other instruments of power under the control of the civil authority.
• The 3-D concept is rapidly growing into a broader and more effective strategic whole-of-government
and grand-strategy whole-of-alliance paradigm.
• Participants recommended that these models be utilized as the essential organizing principles to
make carefully-staffed supplementary recommendations to the appropriate authority to establish a
comprehensive North American process for active intergovernmental and multilateral policy coordination
and cooperation.
• In these terms, they further recommended that governments and their security-related institutions
continue to develop appropriate organizational mechanisms that will achieve an effective unity of effort.
The intent is to ensure that the application of the various civil-military instruments of power directly
contributes to a viable and mutually agreed political end-state. Generating a more complete unity of
effort will require conceptual and organizational contributions at the international, as well as the national
level.

The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College (USAWC); Queen’s University in
Kingston, Ontario, Canada; and the Canadian Land
Forces Doctrine and Training System cosponsored a
colloquium at Kingston, Ontario, Canada, on June 21-23,
2006, entitled, “Defense, Development, and Diplomacy
(3D): Canadian and U.S. Military Perspectives.” This
colloquium brought together over 130 Canadian, U.S.,
and other international government and academic
experts; think tank members; and university faculty
members. Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, Chief of
the Canadian Land Staff; Lieutenant General Michael
Gauthier, Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary
Force Command; and (by video-teleconferencing)
Brigadier General David Fraser, Commander of the
Canadian Brigade operating under NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) auspices in Kandahar,
Afghanistan, led the Canadian military representation.
Major General Charles Jacoby, Commander, U.S.
Army, Alaska, and former Deputy Commander,
U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, 2004-05; and Brigadier
General Frederick Rudesheim, Deputy Director for
Political-Military Affairs, Western Hemisphere at the
Joint Staff, J5, led the U.S. military representation.
All the participants, through a robust program of
panels and question and answer discussions, examined
the considerable experience of the United States
and Canada in the use of military, diplomatic, and
economic instruments to deal with the full spectrum
of nontraditional and traditional security threats in
the contemporary global security environment. This
colloquium was considered to be a very timely and
important effort, given the likelihood that individual
national powers—such as the United States and
Canada—and international organizations—such as the
United Nations, NATO, and the OAS (Organization
of American States)— increasingly will be expected
to provide the leverage to ensure peace, security, and
stability in an increasing number of post-conflict and
stabilization situations over the next several years.

cooperatively helping to provide a secure environment,
making and keeping the peace, restoring or developing
economic and social structures, and helping to build
free and stable political institutions in the parts of the
world in which stabilization and post-conflict operations
have been ongoing. Additionally, participants recognized and articulated the need for coordination and
cooperation in North American homeland defense
efforts. The September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks and
the political, economic, and security repercussions of
that event provided a disquieting reason for creating a
policy and structure for national security planning and
administration in both the United States and Canada.
The new policies that stemmed from those attacks
in New York City and Washington, DC, addressed
directly the need to protect the homeland, while at
the same time constructing an effective mechanism to
combat threats to national security interests abroad.
Clearly, the United States, Canada, Europe,
and those other parts of the global community most
integrated into the interdependent world economy are
embroiled in a security arena in which time-honored
concepts of national security and the classical military
means to attain it, while still necessary, are no longer
sufficient. In addition to traditional regional security
issues, an array of nontraditional threats challenges the
global community. These include state and nonstate,
military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, direct
and indirect, and a mixture of some or all of the
above kinds of threats. Whatever this type of “war” or
“conflict” is called—Fourth Generation War, Irregular
War, Insurgency War, Asymmetric War, or PostModern War, contemporary conflict is the product of
weak or collapsing nation-states and the emergence of
new organizing principles.
The primary organizing principle is asymmetry—
or the use of disparity between the contending parties
to gain advantage. Wise competitors will seek to shift
the playing field away from conventional military
confrontations, and tend to employ terrorist tactics and
strategies and other unconventional forms of assault on
“enemy” nations and “undesirable” global institutions.
Another defining characteristic of contemporary war
stems from “ungoverned” or “lawless” territories.
In this context, a government’s failure to extend an
effective sovereign presence throughout its national
territory leaves a vacuum in which gangs, drug cartels,
leftist and religious insurgents, the political and narco-

The Contemporary Threat Environment—
At Home and Abroad.
The major trend that permeated the colloquium
dialogue involved a generalized move toward the
consideration of the role of the military, diplomatic,
and economic instruments of national power in
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Right, warlords, and governments may all compete for
power—and contribute substantially to the processes
of state failure. In many cases, this unconventional
type of conflict requires the imposition of law and
order by the international community to generate
regional stability, development, peace, and effective
sovereignty. In this new global security environment,
war can be everywhere and can involve everybody and
everything. All this represents a sea-change in warfare,
and requires nothing less than a paradigm change in
how conflict is conceived and managed.

at home, demand a fully integrated and unified effort on
the part of all the instruments of contemporary national
power. Additionally, the 3D approach requires a unity
of effort with allies—a whole-of-alliance approach.
The Challenges and Tasks Ahead.
The logic and general flow of the colloquium
discussion argues that the conscious choices that civilmilitary leadership in the international community and
individual nation-states make about how to deal with
the contemporary, nontraditional security environment
will define the processes of national, regional, and
global security, stability, and well-being far into the
future. The continuing challenge for Canada, the
United States, and the other parts of the hemispheric
and global communities, then, is to exploit the fact
that contemporary security—at whatever level—is, at
base, a holistic political-diplomatic, socio-economic,
psychological-moral, and military-police effort. The
corollary is to move from a singular military approach
to a multidimensional whole-of-government and whole
of alliance/coalition paradigm. The Canadian wholeof-government approach and the NATO whole-ofalliance model to homeland defense and global security
requirements do that, and could be very useful as primary
organizational principles to establish a comprehensive
North American process for active intergovernment
and multilateral policy cooperation. That, in turn,
requires a conceptual framework and an organizational
structure to promulgate unified civil-military planning
and implementation of the multidimensional, multiorganizational, and multilateral/multinational security
concept.
The associated task, as a consequence, is multilevel.
It is at once conceptual and organizational. Ways and
means to begin the implementation of this set of tasks
would include but not be limited to the following
actions:

The Canadian Response to the Reality of the “New”
Global Security Arena.
Another dominant theme within the colloquium
dialogue stressed the evolution of a new conflict
paradigm in which traditional state security institutions
continue to play major roles, but are closely coordinated
with all the other instruments of power under the
control of the Canadian civil authority. Since 9/11,
it has been recognized that fighting global terrorism,
stabilizing failing or failed states, or confronting a
national man-made or natural disaster together, but
separately, is neither efficient nor effective. Dealing
with these kinds of national and global threats involves
the entire population of affected countries, as well as
large numbers of civilian and military national and
international governmental and nongovernmental
organizations and agencies—and subnational, indigenous actors. As a result, a viable unity of effort is required
to coordinate the many multidimensional, multiorganizational, and multilateral/multinational activities
necessary to play in a given security arena. Thus, all
means that can be brought to bear on a given threat
situation must be utilized to achieve strategic clarity
and the grand strategy objectives of the government.
In these terms, superior firepower is no panacea,
and technology may not give one a knowledge or
information advantage. Likewise, traditional military
and police power—although helpful—is not wellsuited for generating economic-political development
or confronting some sort of internal catastrophe. Thus,
Canada has begun to implement an integrating strategy
that draws on its diplomatic, development, and defense
resources to deal with direct threats to that country or
indirect threats to its interests abroad. This 3D approach
internationally, and the whole-of-government approach
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•

Hemispheric leaders must emphasize the
interconnectivity among national and global
political, economic, and security challenges—
and the need for greater multinational
cooperation.

•

Civilian and military leaders at all levels must
learn the fundamental nature of subversion
and insurgency with particular reference to the

way in which military and nonmilitary, lethal
and nonlethal, and direct and indirect force can
be employed to achieve political ends. Leaders
must also understand the way in which politicalpsychological considerations affect the use of
force.
•

As a corollary, the debate on aggregate power
has begun to address how military power can be
brought to bear on “nonmilitary” issues. That
debate must now turn the problem around and
address how “nonmilitary” economic or other
types of power may be used in a military or law
enforcement context.

•

Operations will achieve strategic clarity and
maximum effectiveness as a result of integrating
both horizontal and vertical planning and
implementations processes from the outset. That
is, the organizational integration of horizontal
(i.e., multinational/multilateral) political-military
planning and operations with vertical national
(e.g., U.S. interagency) political-military
planning operations must be implemented to
achieve synergy toward the achievement of an
agreed political vision.

•

Two fundamental organizational mechanisms are
necessary—a national executive-level management structure and an international executivelevel coordinating body—to help eliminate
“ad-hoc-ery” and to help ensure vertical and
horizontal unity of effort.

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the Department of the Army, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This colloquium
brief is cleared for public release; distribution is
unlimited.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s Homepage at
www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

4

